Managerial Decision Making Under Uncertainty: The Case of Twenty20 Cricket by Sacheti, A. et al.
	



	
				
			
	

	
				


 	!∀!#∃
%& ∋	!()	
!∗+,−./01∃∗
1∃
		%2
	%,−2	3

 
	4

∋!.5+.066&/
(  7.,5&−−,
		8

∃.−..55.,5−−,.,−−..
		
			
	9	

				

1 
 
 
 
Managerial Decision Making under Uncertainty: the case of 
Twenty20 cricket 
 
 
Abstract 
We consider managerial decision making by examining the impact of decisions 
taken by cricket captains on Twenty20 International (T20I) match outcomes.  In 
particular, we examine whether pressure from external commentators is 
associated with sub-optimal decision making by captains.  Applying a 
conditional logit model to the full population of T20Is, we find little evidence 
that winning the toss improves the likelihood of winning.  There is some 
evidence that captains have become more likely to follow the conventional 
wisdom over time and choose to bat.  This finding is consistent with increasing 
VRFLDOSUHVVXUHFRQVWUDLQLQJFDSWDLQV·GHFLVions as the T20I format grows in 
importance. 
 
 
Keywords: cricket, decision making, uncertainty, conditional logit. 
JEL codes: L83, D8, D83. 
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 Managerial Decision Making under Uncertainty: the case of 
Twenty20 cricket 
Introduction 
We examine choice under uncertainty by considering the batting order choices of 
international cricket captains WKHVHTXHQFHLQZKLFKWKHWZRWHDPV³EDW´DQG³ERZO´
upon winning the random pre-match coin toss in light of concern about a widely held, 
though possibly incorrect belief regarding the optimal choice of batting order.  The 
choice of batting order is a non-trivial decision because of the potential effects of the 
playing surface and weather conditions on cricket match outcomes. 
The use of professional sport as a testing ground for economic behaviour has a 
rich heritage.  Bhaskar (2009) looks at decisions taken upon winning the toss in 
professional cricket matches by likening them to randomized trials.  Walker and 
Wooders (2001) consider serving behaviour in professional tennis matches to 
investigate mixed strategy equilibria.  Duggan and Levitt (2002) use sumo wrestling in 
Japan to examine corruption whilst Berri and Simmons (2009) consider discrimination 
using data from the National Football League (NFL). 
Whilst experimental economists often use moderate financial incentives to try to 
induce rational behaviour amongst subjects in a laboratory setting (Camerer and 
Lowenstein, 2004), professional sportspersons tend to face very strong performance 
incentives because of the nature of their jobs, with considerable opportunities to learn 
over time.  Further, data on professional sport often have the advantage of being 
detailed, comprehensive and accessible.  The competitive nature of professional sport 
also means that decisions taken in these environments are particularly likely to help in 
furthering the understanding of decision making in other competitive environments. 
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Our study of choice under uncertainty builds on a recent literature that has 
examined decision making under a type of uncertainty in which the decision maker is 
influenced by a lesser informed judge.  Brandenburger and Polak (1996) show how 
managers may withhold private information from the market because of a short term 
concern over their company¶V share price, while Cummins and Nyman (2005) 
demonstrate how inefficiencies can be endogenously created by very competitive 
environments in which one party is better informed than the other.  For example, firms 
are often better informed than their consumers but must satisfy their consumers¶ 
preferences. 
Boyle and Haynes (2009) and Whannel (2006) have commented on the 
increasing prominence of major professional sports in the mass media, which has 
consequently heightened the scrutiny on major sportspersons.  Due to the heavy 
influence of the media on professional sport, media opinions serve as external 
judgement on the decisions of international captains.  Similar to the influence of the 
view of the external market on managers in the corporate world (Hirshleifer, 1993; 
Brandenburger and Polak, 1996), cricket captains are strongly aware of the critical 
opinions of the media. 
Indeed, there exist further similarities between captains and corporate managers.  
Captains have a number of responsibilities with the ultimate goal of winning matches 
for their teams, just as managers of firms have the responsibility of managing their 
employees with the ultimate aim of maximizing profits for their companies. Also, 
captains are typically appointed for relatively short tenures.  Whilst they are most likely 
to extend their tenures if they are successful in winning matches, captains may take 
decisions that benefit them rather than their teams given their short tenures.  Narayanan 
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(1985) demonstrates that managers who are appointed for longer tenures are less likely 
to take decisions that prioritize short term gains ahead of longer term profit 
maximization.  Similarly, Hirshleifer (1993) suggests that managers can make 
investment choices that are bad for shareholders but make the manager look better in the 
short run. 
We present and test a model RIFDSWDLQV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ in which a captain¶V
decision making is constrained by social pressure.  This social pressure is caused by a 
received wisdom, prevalent amongst the cricket media, that batting first is superior over 
the alternative of bowling first.  This received wisdom in the cricket media has also 
been noted by Bhaskar (2009).  It has its origins in the early history of Test cricket, the 
oldest form of international cricket, where batting first was considered advantageous.  
Recent statistical analysis (Allsopp and Clarke, 2004) has offered little supporting 
evidence for this belief, yet this received wisdom has persisted over time: captains who 
choose to bowl and lose in important Test and One Day International (ODI)1 matches 
are subject to widespread criticism. 
In contrast to previous work on this topic, we examine a relatively new format of 
the game called Twenty20 International (T20I) cricket, a second version of limited 
overs cricket.  This allows us to observe FDSWDLQV¶ decision making from the very 
inception of this format of the game and to test whether their decision making improves 
or worsens over time, given the considerable opportunities to learn.  We thus add to the 
literature on economic decision making by examining data on how successfully T20I 
captains perform in making one important decision repeatedly. 
                                                 
1
 ODI cricket is the first version of limited overs international cricket, played since 1971. It has been 
played at 40, 45, 50, 55 or 60 overs a side, but has remained at 50 overs a side for the last two decades. 
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Background and literature review 
Choice under uncertainty 
Baird (1989) suggests that ³WKHEHVWZD\WRMXGJHWKHFRPSHWHQFHRIDQ\H[HFXWLYH«LV
by the quality of decisions made in complex situations when IDFHGZLWKXQFHUWDLQW\´
(p.5).  When making these decisions, managers may face uncertainty from various 
sources, such as the changing nature of demand for their goods, supply side changes and 
invention and innovation (Jones, 2004). 
As mentioned, of primary interest to this study are decisions in which 
individuals are influenced by oWKHUV¶MXGJPHQWRIWKHLUDFWLRQV  Brandenburger and 
Polak (1996) showed that managers withhold private information to keep share prices in 
line with market expectations instead of maximizing profits, whilst Narayanan (1985) 
demonstrates that managers may use private information to make decisions that result in 
short term gains at the expense of shareholders.  However, the likelihood of these 
decisions is inversely related to experience and length of contract.  Baker and Nyman 
(2009) suggest that job market interviewees may not necessarily disclose whether they 
are suited to the job to their potential employers. Cummins and Nyman (2007) discuss 
incentives created by rank order promotion tournaments within companies in which 
employees may be forced to agree wLWKWKHLUVXSHULRUV¶LQFRUUHFWSUH-conceived notions 
about investment decisions in order to gain promotion. In each of these uncertain 
situations, individuals face incentives that leave them unwilling to make efficient use of 
the information available, as their choices are evaluated by those with inferior 
information. Indeed, as Cummins and Nyman (2005) suggest, it is the very 
competitiveness of these environments that drives such behaviour. 
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Roles of cricket captains 
In professional cricket, the captain plays a key role in the running of his team.  He bears 
several responsibilities, including formulating plans and strategies within matches and 
series; having a say in team and squad selections; acting as a team spokesperson during 
interactions with the media and maintaining team morale in a squad of up to sixteen 
other players. 
In international cricket teams, the selection committee is akin to a principal and 
the captain to an agent.  The selectors choose squads and appoint captains with the aim 
of winning matches and series, so cricket captains are accountable to their selectors (and 
in some countries, the administrators of their national governing body).  Whilst the 
selectors can observe decisions taken by the captain, they are not privy to the FDSWDLQ¶V
motivations.  Given the level of competition; pressure faced from selectors and the fact 
that T20I cricket usually has only two outcomes, one might expect captains to care only 
about winning matches.  However, there is a major source of external pressure on 
captains from the cricket media. Cricket captains face intense scrutiny of their decisions. 
,IWKHVHGHFLVLRQVDUHUHSRUWHGDVFRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHWHDP¶VIDLOXUHWKHUHDUHVHYHUH
FRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHFDSWDLQ¶VFDUHHU 
Previous studies on social pressure have noted such external influence on 
behaviour.  For example, Bernheim (1994) constructed a model of social interaction in 
which DQLQGLYLGXDO¶V utility function includes a need for social approval in addition to 
standard consumption utility.  In this model, the social status of an individual is 
assumed to depend in part on the public perception of him or her. 
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The batting order decision 
Batting order decision making provides a useful natural experiment of choice under 
uncertainty.  The captain chooses between two alternatives not knowing what the 
outcome will be, just as, for example, a manager might choose between two employees 
not knowing whether they will be productive for the company or a prospective 
university student may decide between two courses not knowing which course will 
maximize career earnings.  While this decision is sometimes made in consultation with 
the team coach and other players, the captain bears responsibility for it.  Further, data on 
the batting order decision and the final match outcome are available and unambiguous. 
Several international captains have faced extreme criticism after choosing to 
bowl first and losing in important matches.  After bowling first and losing the second 
Test of the 2005 Ashes series, a series Australia subsequently lost, the former Australian 
captain Ricky Ponting never chose to bowl first in a Test match again.  The former 
English captain Mike Denness was sacked after losing the first Test match of the 1975 
Ashes series against Australia, partly because of his decision to bowl first. Another 
former English captain, Nasser Hussain, commented on the long standing criticism of 
his decision to bowl in the opening Test match of the 2002-03 Ashes, which England 
subsequently lostVD\LQJ³LWKDVEHHQlabelled the biggest mistake I made as England 
FDSWDLQ´-RKQ In ODIs, Indian captain Sourav Ganguly received considerable 
criticism after choosing to bowl first in the 2003 World Cup final against Australia, 
which India subsequently lost. 
We look at FDSWDLQV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJLQthe relatively new T20I format (first 
played in February 2005HQDEOLQJXVWRH[DPLQHWKHHYROXWLRQRIFDSWDLQV¶GHFLVLRQV
since the very inception of this format of the game.  This novelty of T20I cricket can 
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potentially provide insights into learning over time.  Specifically, in the early days of 
T20I cricket, matches were treated less seriously by the media.  As interest in the format 
has grown, decision making by captains has come under a similar level of scrutiny to 
other forms of cricket. 
The frequent discussion of the effect of the toss and batting order choice on 
professional cricket match outcomes has made it a subject of some interest in the 
literature, including, amongst others, de Silva and Swartz (1997), who found that 
winning the toss offers no competitive advantage in ODI matches. The toss seemingly 
does not provide a real advantage in Test cricket or ODI cricket played in the day.2  
Despite this, batting first continues to be considered a superior choice by the cricket 
media. 
T20I matches typically last only three hours and tend to attract large crowds.3 
Due to the shorter length of matches compared to other formats (for example, ODI 
matches are typically played for seven hours, whilst Test matches can be played for up 
to six hours a day for five consecutive days), the impact of changes in weather and pitch 
conditions is likely to be smaller in T20I cricket than ODI and Test cricket, making it an 
interesting format in which to assess the effect of the toss. 
 
An economic model of the batting choice decision 
On winning the toss, a captain is faced with the choice of batting or bowling first.  
Excluding ties and abandoned matches, there are only two possible results in T20I 
cricket: a win or a loss. This gives four possible decision and outcome combinations.  
                                                 
2
 One exception is Dawson et al. (2009), who investigated day/night ODI matches and found that winning 
the toss and batting first increased the chance of winning 
3
 Based on data available to the authors (for 82 T20I matches in the sample), average crowd attendance 
for T20Is is 21,315 spectators per match. 
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One might expect captains to make the choice of batting order in a T20I match with the 
sole aim of winning. Winning is more pleasurable than losing and successive losses 
may cause the captain to lose their job.  However, we propose that the pressure exerted 
by scrutiny from the media is also likely to influence their behaviour, in particular 
through the incorrect but entrenched received wisdom that batting first increases the 
chance of a team winning as compared to bowling first. 
:HSUHVHQWDPRGHORIFDSWDLQV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJLQ7,FULFNHWWe propose 
that social pressXUHRSHUDWHVDVDFRQVWUDLQWRQFDSWDLQV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ  That is, 
captains seek to maximise their expected return subject to satisfying this social 
constraint.  This modelling strategy is akin to a manager who seeks to maximise profits 
subject to operational constraints or a consumer who maximises utility subject to a 
budget constraint. In this case, as the social pressure constraint tightens over time, 
captains are predicted to take increasingly sub-optimal decisions.  We first show a 
FDSWDLQ¶VH[SHFWHG utility function: 
EU= pUW + (1-p)UL 
EU = UL + p(UW²UL)        [1] 
where: 
p = probability of team winning  
UW = utility gained from winning match 
UL= utility gained from losing match 
Let p=t+e, where t is the increase or decrease in probability of winning from batting 
first, whilst e is everything else that determines the probability of winning. 
EU = UL + [E(t)(Bat)+e](UW-UL), where 
-1  t  1 DQGWH  
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The captain maximises EU subject to S+ E(t)  0, where: 
S = social pressure 
E(t) = expected impact of batting first on the probability of winning 
 
Without social pressure, to maximize EU a captain will choose to bat (Bat=1) if 
E(t)>0, meaning the expected impact of batting first on the chance of winning is 
positive.  He will choose to bowl (Bat=0) if E(t)<0, as the expected impact of batting 
first on winning is negative.  However, in this case, with E(t)<0 and bowling first being 
the correct choice, social pressure has the potential to change the decision.  To illustrate 
this, let the constraint to bat first be binding if S + E(t)>0, meaning that social pressure 
to bat first is greater than the expected beneficial impact of bowling first on winning.  
Figure 1 shows how the social pressure constraint affects expected utility by plotting 
expected utility against the marginal change in the probability of winning from winning 
the toss.  With no social pressure, as t approaches -1 (meaning the probability of losing 
after batting first approaches certainty), EU increases with bowling first because it 
makes winning more likely.  However, if constrained by social pressure, captains will 
take sub-optimal decisions, choosing to bat even though it lowers expected utility. 
As mentioned, interest in the T20I format has grown over time, so it is likely 
social pressure on T20I captains has also risen. Increasing social pressure on captains is 
likely to conflict with the effect of increasing knowledge of T20I cricket: with 
increasing experience of T20I cricket, captains would be expected to make better 
decisions at the toss, based on knowledge of which choice is likely to be more 
successful.  However, as our model suggests, increasing social pressure is likely to 
FRQVWUDLQFDSWDLQV¶GHFLVLRQVLQZKLFKFDVHWKHHIIect of the toss would be expected to 
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decrease over time.  Based on this, we propose a series of hypotheses. If greater 
knowledge of T20I cricket leads to better decision making, the toss will be expected to 
have an increasing positive effect on winning over time; however, if social pressure 
increases over time, the effect of the toss will be expected to decrease over time. 
The effect of social pressure on T20I captains is also likely to differ in home and 
away matches.  One would expect that captains playing at home would take better 
decisions at the toss based on knowledge of local conditions and which choice is more 
successful in their own countries: given this, the toss would be expected to have a 
stronger effect at home.  However, there is more scrutiny of home captains by fans and 
particularly the media, which is likely to increase social pressure on T20I captains at 
home and due to which the effect of the toss will be expected to be lower in home 
games. 
As Narayanan (1985) suggests, in the corporate world, experienced managers 
are less likely to be affected by social pressure to prove their ability and consequently 
put short term share prices ahead of longer term profit maximization for their firms.  
Similarly, more experienced T20I captains are less likely to be affected by social 
pressure from the media and so take better decisions.  Given this, if social pressure on 
longer term captains is lower, the effect of the toss will be expected to increase with 
captaincy experience. 
In our empirical analysis, we test for the effect of the toss and batting order 
choice over time on match outcome considering the potentially conflicting effects of 
social pressure and home advantage. 
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Econometric model and data 
Conditional logit model 
Our core empirical approach is to estimate conditional logit models of the probability of 
winning.  The data are organized with two observations for every match, representing 
the winning and losing team respectively.  Due to the inherent dependence between 
teams in each match, some previous studies such as Duggan and Levitt (2002) clustered 
the standard errors for each match.  Simply clustering the standard errors, however, does 
not control for the fact that the two observations for each match are correlated with each 
other by construction.  For this reason, we follow Dawson et al. (2009) and use the 
conditional (fixed effects) logit model.  Koop (2008) explains that conditional logit 
analysis can be employed when multiple alternatives exist with variance across 
alternatives for any individual.  For comparison, we also report OLS estimates in which 
the dependent variable is the margin of victory (or loss) for each team. 
We follow the notation of Dawson et al. (2009) in constructing a conditional 
logit model: ݕכ݉ݐ ൌ ݔ݉ݐߚ൅ ߙ݉ ൅ ߝ݉ݐ    [2] 
where y*mt (m refers to match and t to team) is an unobserved variable measuring team 
performance; xmt is a vector of explanatory variables; ȕ is a vector of unknown 
parameters; Įm is an idiosyncratic fixed effect associated with match i and İmt is a 
random error term accounting for discrepancies between observed responses and 
predicted outcomes. 
ymt can also be written as the binary response variable that measures the 
performance of the team: 
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ymt =  1 if the team wins 
0 otherwise 
 
The probability of the team winning is given in Equation 3: ሺ ௧ܻ ൌ ⁡?ȁݔ௠௧ ǡ ߙ௠ሻ ൌ ୣ୶୮ሺఈ೘ାఉ௫೘೟ሻଵାୣ୶୮ሺఈ೘ାఉ௫೘೟ሻ    [3] 
For comparison, we follow Clarke and Allsopp (2001) in reporting OLS estimates in 
which the dependent variable is the margin of victory (or loss) for each team with 
similar explanatory variables. One advantage of the OLS model in this context is that 
the margin of victory provides additional variation in the dependent variable which 
increases the precision of the inference in the analysis. However, , captains are likely to 
gain utility primarily from the match result as opposed to the margin of victory or defeat. 
Moreover, the OLS model is unable to control for the inherent dependence between the 
two teams in each match. As such, we regard the OLS estimates as a robustness check 
for our preferred conditional logit estimates.  For consistency, we continue to exclude 
tied  matches in the OLS models.  The basic OLS model is provided below: ୫୲ ൌ ⁡?୫୲Ⱦ ൅ ୫୲ 
 [4] 
where zmt (m refers to match and t to team) measures the margin of victory (or loss) in 
runs; x¶mt is a vector of explanatory variables; ȕ is a vector of unknown parameters and 
umt is a random error term.  We use standard errors that are robust to within match 
correlation. 
Variables 
The discussion above suggests a number of variables expected to influence T20I match 
outcome.  This list of variables and their description is provided in Table 1.  Data on the 
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variables are available for every match in the sample.  Win and Margin are used as the 
dependent variables when estimating the probability of winning and the margin of 
winning respectively.  Toss is a binary variable which assumes the value 1 if the team 
wins the toss or 0 if it loses.  The expected sign on Toss is positive, though previous 
studies have found mixed results on its effect on Test and ODI match outcomes. 
We include TossDecisionBat and TossDecisionBowl as variables that assume the 
value 1 if the team wins the toss and chooses to bat and the team wins the toss and 
chooses to bowl respectively, 0 otherwise.  These terms are included to assess the effect 
of the batting order choice upon winning the toss on match outcome.  Home is a binary 
variable which assumes the value 1 if the team is playing at home, 0 otherwise.  This 
variable is included because of the widely observed home field advantage in 
professional team sports (Nevill and Holder, 1999).  Due to this, teams playing at home 
are expected to better exploit knowledge of pitch (the playing surface area) and weather 
conditions and to benefit from crowd support.  Home is thus expected to have a positive 
coefficient.  We include a Toss*Home interaction term to examine the effect of winning 
the toss at home.  TeamStrengths controls for the relative strengths of the two teams, 
defined as the difference in pre match T20I ratings between the team and its opponent.  
This variable is expected to have a positive coefficient, with the higher pre match rated 
team expected to win.  DayNight is a binary variable indicating whether the match was 
played under floodlights.  Time is the number of the T20I that the team is playing, so 
that, for example, the fourth T20I that Australia played has a Time value of 4, the fifth a 
Time value of 5 and so on for all seventeen teams in the sample.  Time will be interacted 
with Toss to ascertain the effect of the toss over time.  Finally, Experience shows the 
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number of T20Is the captain of the team had led in prior to the game.  Toss will be 
interacted with Experience WRWHVWWKHHIIHFWRIH[SHULHQFHRQFDSWDLQV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ 
 
Data 
The data comprise all 301 T20I matches played by the seventeen T20I teams4 between 
February 2005 and May 2013, not including seven matches that were abandoned due to 
poor weather conditions and eight others that were tied.  The data were obtained from 
the ESPNcricinfo web site.  For each match our dataset includes the date; venue; 
FRPSHWLQJWHDPVEDWWLQJRUGHUZKLFKWHDP¶VFDSWDLQZRQWKHWRVVEDWWLQJRUGHU
decision taken by the captain who won the toss; match result; whether the game was 
played under floodlights; whether one team was playing at home; number of T20Is each 
team had played DQGWKHQXPEHURI7,VHDFKWHDP¶VFDSWDLQKDGOHGLQSULRUWRWKH
match. 
To measure relative team strengths and in the absence of pre-match betting odds, 
we construct a rating system for T20I matches partly basHGRQWKH,&&¶VT20I cricket 
rating system.5 Also, the result margin in runs for matches in which the team batting 
second won (where the result was achieved in terms of wickets and overs remaining, 
rather than runs) was obtained by converting the wickets and overs remaining into a 
runs value using the T20 scaled Duckworth-Lewis table for rain affected matches 
(Duckworth and Lewis, 1998). 
                                                 
4
 These are, in order of playing T20Is: New Zealand, Australia, England, South Africa, West Indies, Sri 
Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, India, Kenya, Scotland, Netherlands, Ireland, Canada, Bermuda 
and Afghanistan. 
5
 There are two differences from the way the ICC rating system is calculated.  Firstly, the ODI rating of 
the team at the time of its first T20I match was used as its initial T20I rating, with each team given, for 
points calculation purposes, a base number of ten matches. Secondly, our T20I ratings system does not 
restrict the sample of matches used to those played in the previous two years only, as the ICC system 
does, because the volume of T20Is is small. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics 
In Table 2, we report summary statistics for each variable and also the mean win 
percentages in particular circumstances.  The raw data suggest a modest benefit from 
winning the toss, with the team that wins the toss winning about 52% of matches.  
Despite the side batting first winning less than half of matches, captains chose to bat 
over 57% of the time. 
Teams choosing to bowl emerged victorious in slightly more than 51% of cases, 
compared to just under 52% for teams choosing to bat. In day/night games, the winning 
percentage for teams winning the toss is only 44%, suggesting an apparent disadvantage 
from winning the toss in such matches.  The team batting first in day/night games won 
almost 57% of the time.  Teams playing at home win almost 53% of the time and, 
further, teams winning the toss at home win nearly 55% of the time, suggesting an 
advantage from playing at home in T20I cricket. 
Next, we split the sample into three chronological periods to investigate changes 
over time. In particular, we examine whether captains are adapting their decisions in 
light of previous T20I matches because early on, captains were unaware of optimal 
batting order choices, but one would expect them to have learned these choices over 
time.  We report the percentage of matches in which the captain chose to bat; the 
percentage of teams that won after choosing to bat and finally the percentage of teams 
that won after batting first regardless of which team won the toss.  We then look at how 
these proportions change over time. 
The first two splits are of 100 matches each, whilst the third split comprises 101 
matches.  The results are reported in Table 3.  The split sample percentages show that in 
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the first third of T20Is, captains chose to bat 49% of the time, but in the second and 
final third of T20Is, captains choose to bat in over 60% of matches.  However, because 
of the large standard errors, the changes are not necessarily strong evidence of a shift in 
decision making, possibly being variations caused by the small sample instead. 
Although the percentage of matches won by teams choosing to bat first rose in 
the second third of T20Is, it dropped sharply in the final third of matches.  Further, 
while the percentage of teams winning batting first regardless of the toss rose in the 
second third of T20Is (again, the standard errors are large), there was a decline in the 
final third, in contrast to the continuingly high proportion of captains batting first. If the 
data are capturing the true effect, rather than varying because of the small number of 
observations, this shift suggests that the decision making of captains could possibly be 
driven by reasons other than winning alone. 
Referring back to our theoretical model, it is possible captains are responding to 
a conventional wisdom that constrains decisions, which is consistent with the effect of 
external judgment by those with inferior information. International captains are better 
informed about team strengths, strategies and pitch conditions than the media, but may 
similarly take decisions in line with media opinions because of the potential criticism 
from bowling and losing.  By doing so, captains can partially control for adverse 
consequences from the outcomes of their decisions.  Similar to the old management 
DGDJHWKDW³QRRQH ever JRWILUHGIRUEX\LQJ,%0´S1, Bhaskar 2009), by choosing to 
bat first captains can reduce criticism of their decision making. 
To further examine decision making by captains in T20Is, we consider decisions 
made by individual captains. At the time of writing, in June 2013, there had been 72 
captains of the seventeen T20I teams.  Of these 72 captains, only 23 led their teams in 
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more than ten T20Is. In Table 4, we report the proportion of decisions to bat by captains 
based on the experience of captains.  Interestingly, captains who led in more than ten 
games batted first more often than those who led in fewer than ten matches.  However, 
WKHVHVWDWLVWLFVEHLQJFXPXODWLYHGRQRWVKRZKRZLQGLYLGXDOFDSWDLQV¶GHFLVLRQ
making evolved over time. As mentioned, Narayanan (1985) demonstrated that 
managers with more experience were less likely to be influenced by market opinion and 
SXWVKRUWWHUPEHQHILWVILUVW,WLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRFRQVLGHULIFDSWDLQV¶EDWWLQJRUGHUFKRLFHV
evolve similarly. 
The descriptive statistics make clear that any influence of the toss on win 
probabilities is moderated by other factors.  For this reason, we now move on to a 
multivariate regression analysis. 
 
Econometric estimates 
Conditional logit estimation 
We report the conditional logit estimates in Table 5.  Using this method, we estimate 
two observations per match but incorporate match fixed effects. 
We include Toss, TeamStrengths and Home as explanatory variables in the first 
regression.  Toss and Home both have positive coefficients as expected, but are 
statistically insignificant.  However, TeamStrengths is very significant, at the 1% level 
of confidence.  The coefficient on Toss was positive and statistically significant prior to 
the inclusion of TeamStrengths.  However, once TeamStrengths was included, the 
coefficient was no longer significant, suggesting the effect of the toss recedes once the 
relative strength of the team to its opponent is controlled for.  To interpret the 
coefficient on TeamStrengths, we convert the coefficient into its marginal effect, 
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showing the partial derivative of the probability of winning with respect to 
TeamStrengths.  The marginal effect is 0.003, implying that a 1% increase in the pre-
match ratings point difference is likely to raise the probability of winning a T20I by 
0.3%. 
In the second regression, we separate the batting order choice taken upon 
winning the toss by considering TossDecisionBat and TossDecisionBowl separately. 
The marginal effect of winning the toss and batting on winning the match is greater than 
that of winning the toss and bowling.  However, the two interaction terms are 
statistically insignificant, as is Home. 
In the third regression, we examine the effect of winning the toss over time by 
interacting Toss with Time.  The interaction term is statistically insignificant, suggesting 
the effect of the toss is not significant over time, even though the coefficient is negative.  
In the fourth regression, we consider the effect of playing at home and winning the toss 
at home to assess the importance of home advantage in T20Is.  The sum of the 
coefficients on Toss and Toss*Home is around 0.123, but both variables are 
insignificant. 
In the fifth regression, we consider the effect of captaincy experience and also 
interact captaincy experience with winning the toss to see how this evolves with time.  
Experience is not significant, though Toss*Experience is only slightly insignificant at 
the 10% level.  The sum of the coefficients on Toss and Toss*Experience is positive. In 
the final regression, we consider the effect of winning the toss in day/night games.  The 
interaction term has a negative coefficient, implying that winning the toss in a day/night 
game reduFHVDWHDP¶VFKDQFHVRIZLQQLQJ, though it is insignificant.  Toss is slightly 
significant, though the sum of the coefficients on Toss and the Toss*DayNight 
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interaction term is negative.6 In contrast to ODI matches, which are played partially 
during the day time and partially during the evening, day/night T20I matches are 
typically played entirely during the night. Given this, conditions would be expected to 
change less markedly in day/night T20I matches compared to day/night ODI matches. 
Clearly, the conditional logit estimates suggest relative team strength is the only 
statistically significant explanation of T20I match outcome, robust to a number of 
specifications.  Notably, the effect of the toss over time is statistically insignificant, as is 
the effect of winning the toss at home. 
 
OLS estimation 
As comparison, we report the OLS estimates in Table 6, using margin in runs as the 
dependent variable.  Winning the toss is insignificant, similar to the conditional logit 
estimates. All other things being equal, playing at home raises the margin of victory by 
more than 7 runs, on average.  The Toss*Time interaction term has an insignificant 
coefficient.  The coefficients on the TossDecisionBat and TossDecisionBowl interaction 
terms are again statistically insignificant, suggesting the choice of batting order is not 
significant in raising the margin of victory.  Experience and Toss*Experience are both 
significant, with a positive sum of coefficients between Toss and Toss*Experience, 
suggesting that with increasing experience, captains are likely to win by higher margins 
upon winning the toss, on average.  This provides support for experience lowering the 
effect of social pressure on captains, though increasing captaincy experience is in itself 
reflective of some intrinsic captaincy skill.  Nonetheless, this finding is similar to 
1DUD\DQDQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWPRUHH[SHULHQFHGPDQDJHUVIDFHIHZHULQFHQWLYHV
                                                 
6
 TeamStrengths was interacted with Time but was very insignificant. This is not reported. 
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to prioritize short term gains at the expense of shareholders, as in both cases social 
pressure lessens with experience. 
Evidently, similar to the conditional logit estimates, the OLS results show a very 
significant effect of relative team strengths on the margins of victories in T20Is, with 
the larger the difference, the more likely the higher rated team is to win by a big margin.  
Strikingly, playing at home is statistically significant in influencing the margin of 
victory, in contrast to the conditional logit estimates.  However, the effect of the toss on 
match outcomes is insignificant. As shown in the descriptive statistics, there is tentative 
evidence that captains are leaning towards batting first over time.  Given that the 
multivariate regression results suggest that the toss has no significant effect on match 
outcome, the preference for batting first is surprising. 
So how do our results compare with previous literature? Earlier studies have 
looked at the effect of the toss on Test and ODI matches rather than T20Is, so the 
comparison with our results has to be considered firstly in light of the differences in 
formats and secondly the time needed for captains and players to adapt to a new version 
of the game, though our results partially control for time and experience.  The high 
significance of relative team strengths LVVLPLODUWR$OOVRSSDQG&ODUNH¶VILQGLQJ
that higher rated teams were more successful in Test and ODI matches.  The lack of 
significance for the toss is similar to both de SilvDDQG6ZDUW]¶VUHVXOWIRU2',
FULFNHWDQG$OOVRSSDQG&ODUNH¶VUHVXOWIRU7HVWDQG2',FULFNHW  However, the 
insignificance of playing at home is in contrast to the results obtained by Morley and 
Thomas (2005) and Allsopp and Clarke (2004), who considered home field advantage 
in English domestic and international one day cricket respectively.  The insignificance 
of batting order choice contrasts with Dawson et al. (2009), who found a very 
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significant and positive effect of batting first in day/night ODI matches.  The shorter 
length of T20I matches means that conditions do not change as markedly between 
innings as they do in day/night ODIs, though the toss was nonetheless significant in 
day/night T20Is. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We examine choice under uncertainty by presenting and testing a model to illustrate 
how cricket captains may make decisions subject to a social pressure.  Our model builds 
on the literature on uncertainty in which the decision maker is evaluated by a lesser 
informed judge. As the decision maker responds to what the less informed judge 
expects, sub-optimality results.  One example is found in Brandenburger and Polak 
(1996), who suggest corporate PDQDJHUV³«RIWHQFRPSODLQWKDWWKH\IHHOSUHVVXUHGWR
make the decisions the stock market thinks is correct rather than the decisions they 
EHOLHYHWREHLQWKHEHVWLQWHUHVWVRIWKHLUILUPV´S  Similarly, our model proposes 
that external pressure can lead to sub-optimal GHFLVLRQVWKDWGRQRWPD[LPL]HWKHWHDP¶V
probability of winning. 
Using the entire population of T20Is till May 2013, this paper tests some 
implications of this model.  Our findings suggest that, controlling for relative team 
strengths and home advantage, winning the toss does not have a meaningful impact on 
the outcome of the match, irrespective of the choice to bat or to bowl first.  Furthermore, 
the impact of the toss on winning does not become significant over time.  Despite this, 
we find tentative evidence of a shift towards batting first by T20I captains over time. 
This may be because captains are making batting order choices that shield them from 
media criticism. 
23 
 
Previous literature has noted the theoretical effect of external pressure on 
corporate managers, who may face incentives to prove themselves as good managers or 
to avoid short term criticism of their decision making.  We show how cricket captains 
making one important decision repeatedly (giving them opportunities to learn over time) 
still tend towards making choices that are likely to reduce short term criticism by 
shifting towards batting first more often, despite a lack of evidence to suggest that this 
choice is more successful. 
Our research adds to the literature by identifying that socially influenced 
decision making can occur even in a highly competitive environment.  Indeed, the 
FDSWDLQ¶VEDWWLQJRUGHUFKRLFHLVLQWHQVHO\VFUXWLQL]HGE\WKLUG parties because 
international cricket is highly competitive. This situation is not unlike that found in 
Cummins and Nyman (2005), whereby competition itself contributes to inefficient 
behaviour. If international cricket was less competitive, there would be less third party 
commentary for captains to be concerned about. 
The findings here may be of interest to the ICC in terms of the debate over the 
fairness of day night matches in major tournaments, as discussed by Dawson et al. 
(2009).  Although Test matches and ODIs played in the day do not apparently provide 
the team winning the toss with a major advantage, day/night ODIs do give the team 
batting first after winning the toss an advantage, raising issues about their presence in 
major ODI tournaments. Contrary to the perception that the shorter duration of T20I 
matches makes them more chance than skill driven as compared to ODI cricket and 
especially Test cricket, our results suggest that T20I cricket matches, like Test and ODI 
matches, are generally won by the stronger team and the toss does not play a major role. 
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The T20 format, however, is still in a relatively early period of development.  As 
more matches are played, future research might usefully explore further the evolution of 
learning and adjustment to decision-making trends.  Comparisons with domestic 
Twenty20 competitions, and in particular the Indian Premier League, are also likely to 
be instructive. 
25 
 
References 
Allsopp, P.E. & Clarke S.R. (2004). Rating teams and analysing outcomes in one-day 
and test cricket. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, 167, 657-667. 
Baird, B.F. (1989). Managerial decisions under uncertainty: an introduction to the 
analysis of decision making, Wiley: New York. 
Baker, M.J & Nyman, I. (2009). Competitive Pressure and Lying in Search Markets. 
Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers: 1-38. 
Bernheim, B.D. (1994). A Theory of Conformity. Journal of Political Economy, 102, 
841-77. 
Berri D.J & Simmons R. (2009). Race and the Evaluation of Signal Callers in the 
National Football League. Journal of Sports Economics, 10, 23-43. 
Bhaskar V. (2009). Rational Adversaries? Evidence from randomised trials in one-day 
cricket. The Economic Journal 119, 1-23. 
Boyle R & Haynes R. (2009). Power play: sport, the media and popular culture, 
Edinburgh: University Press Edinburgh. 
Brandenburger, A. & Polak J. (1996). When managers cover their posteriors: making 
the decisions the market wants to see. RAND Journal of Economics, 27, 523-541. 
Camerer, C.F & Loewenstein, G. (2004). Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future. 
In Advances in Behavioral Economics, Camerer CF, Loewenstein G, Rabin M. 
(eds). Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
Cummins J.G & Nyman I. (2005). The dark side of competitive pressure. RAND Journal 
of Economics, 36, 361-377. 
Cummins, J.G & Nyman I. (2007). ³Yes Men´ in Tournaments. Hunter College 
Department of Economics Working Papers, 1-48. 
26 
 
Dawson P, Morley B, Paton D & Thomas, D. (2009). To bat or not to bat: An 
examination of match outcomes in day-night limited overs cricket. Journal of 
the Operational Research Society, 60, 1786-1793. 
de Silva B.M. & Swartz, T.B. (1997). Winning the coin toss and the home advantage in 
one-day international cricket matches. New Zealand Statistician, 32, 16-22. 
Duckworth F. & Lewis A. (1998). A fair method for resetting the target in interrupted 
one-day cricket matches. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 49, 220±
227. 
Duggan, M. & Levitt, S.D. (2002). :LQQLQJ,VQ¶W(YHU\WKLQJCorruption in Sumo 
Wrestling. American Economic Review, 92, 1594-1605. 
ESPNcricinfo StatsGuru (2009-12). Available at http://stats.cricinfo.com/guru (first 
accessed on 10 November 2009). 
Hirshleifer D. (1993). Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions. 
Financial Management, 22, 145-160. 
John E. (2006). Heads we lose. Observer Sport Monthly, 29 October. Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2006/oct/29/cricket.features2 (accessed on 13 
May 2011). 
Jones T. (2004). Business Economics and Managerial Decision Making, John Wiley & 
Sons: Chichester. 
Koop G. (2008). Introduction to Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons: Chichester. 
Morley, B. & Thomas D. (2005). An investigation of home advantage and other factors 
affecting outcomes in English one-day cricket matches. Journal of Sports 
Sciences, 23, 261-268. 
27 
 
Narayanan, M.P. (1985). Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results. The Journal of 
Finance, 40, 1469-1484. 
Nevill AM, Holder RL. (1999). Home advantage in sport: An overview of studies on the 
advantage of playing at home. Sports Medicine, 28, 221-236. 
Walker M, Wooders J. (2001). Minimax Play at Wimbledon. The American Economic 
Review, 91, 1521-1538. 
Whannel G. (2006). Sport and the Media. In Handbook of Sports Studies, Coakley J, 
Dunning E. (eds). Sage: London. 
28 
 
Table 1: Variables and definitions 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean 
Margin 31.8 (2.00) 
TeamStrengths 26.0 (1.71) 
Bat| Toss = 1 57.1 (2.90) 
Bowl| Toss = 1 42.9 (2.90) 
Win % if:  
Toss = 1 51.5 (2.65) 
Bat = 1 49.8 (2.88) 
TossDecisionBat = 1 51.7 (3.81) 
TossDecisionBowl = 1 51.2 (4.40) 
Home = 1 52.5 (3.92) 
Toss*Home = 1 54.9 (5.50) 
Toss*DayNight = 1 44.1 (4.26) 
Bat*DayNight = 1 56.6 (4.25) 
N 301 
  
Note: 
Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Variable Definition 
Win 1 if the team won the match, 0 if it lost 
Margin Margin of the result for the team, in runs 
Toss 1 if the team won the toss, 0 if it lost 
Bat 1 if team batted first; 0 otherwise 
Bowl 1 if the team bowled first, 0 otherwise 
TossDecisionBat 1 if the team won the toss and chose to bat first, 0 if not 
TossDecisionBowl 1 if the team won the toss and chose to bowl first, 0 if not 
Home 1 if the team played at home, 0 if not 
Toss*Home 1 if the team played at home and won the toss, 0 if not 
TeamStrengths Difference in pre match T20I rating between team and opposition 
DayNight 1 if the match was played under lights, 0 if not 
Time The number of T20Is the team had played 
Experience The number of T20Is the captain had led prior to the match 
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Table 3: Decision making and win percentages over time 
 Split 1 N Split 2 N Split 3 N 
Choosing to bat after winning the toss 49.00 (5.00) 49/100 62.00 (4.85) 62/100 60.39 (4.87) 61/101 
Teams winning after choosing to bat 53.06 (7.13) 26/49 58.06 (6.27) 36/62 44.26 (7.05) 27/61 
Teams winning after batting first 43.00 (4.95) 43/100 55.00 (4.97) 55/100 51.49 (4.97) 52/101 
 
Notes: 
(i) Split 1 refers to the first 100 T20Is; Split 2 to the next 100 T20Is and Split 3 to the most recent 101 T20Is. 
(ii) Standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Decision making by individual captains 
Number of matches Tosses won Bat first percentage 
More than 10 219 56.16 (3.35) 
10 or less 82 54.88 (5.50) 
  
Note: 
 Standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 5: Conditional logit (fixed effects) estimates 
Dependent Variable WIN      
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Toss 0.052 
(0.12) 
 0.355 
(0.22) 
0.020 
(0.20) 
0.530 
(0.22)** 
0.313 
(0.17)* 
TeamStrengths 0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
Home 0.115 
(0.16) 
0.112 
(0.16) 
 0.062 
(0.31) 
  
Toss*DayNight      -0.544** 
(0.25) 
Toss*Home    0.103 
(0.51) 
  
TossDecisionBat  0.129 
(0.18) 
    
TossDecisionBowl  0.079 
(0.20) 
    
Toss*Time   -0.013 
(0.008) 
   
Experience     0.027 
(0.015) 
 
Toss*Experience     -0.056 
(0.022) 
 
Pseudo R squared 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Log likelihood -189.367 -189.114 -188.314 -189.347 -186.012 -187.210 
N=602 
 
Notes: 
(i) Robust standard errors used. 
(ii) *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: OLS estimates 
Dependent Variable: MARGIN 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Toss 3.705 
(3.33) 
 7.449 (5.00) 2.674 
(4.00) 
13.761 
(4.79)*** 
7.464 
(3.93)* 
TeamStrengths 0.523 
(0.05)*** 
0.522 
(0.05)*** 
0.520 
(0.05)*** 
0.524 
(0.05)*** 
0.509 
(0.05)*** 
0.513 
(0.05)*** 
Home 7.184 
(3.62)** 
7.171 
(3.63)** 
 5.483 
(5.41) 
  
Toss*DayNight      -7.655 
(4.70) 
Toss*Home    3.302 
(7.24) 
  
TossDecisionBat  5.874 (3.85)     
TossDecisionBowl  2.741  
(4.24) 
    
Toss*Time   -0.151 
(0.16) 
   
Experience     0.825 
(0.28)*** 
 
Toss*Experience     -1.18 
(0.40)*** 
 
R squared 0.202 0.203 0.198 0.201 0.209 0.200 
N=602 
 
Notes: 
(i) Robust standard errors used, clustered by match. 
(ii) * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Loss of utility from social pressure constraint 
 
Note: 
Figure 1 shows the utility loss arising from the social pressure constraint, with values of EU = 2 for a win and EU= 1 for 
a loss. t represents the impact of the toss on the probability of winning. When t=0, the toss has no impact on the 
probability of winning, p=0.5 and EU=1.5. When t is negative, bowling first is preferable and so if the captain is forced 
to bat first due to social pressure, the loss in utility is illustrated by the shaded area. As t approaches ² 1, the loss in EU 
increases, but the level of social pressure required overturn the decision to bowl also increases. 
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